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ARTICLES
TRADE SECRET LAW: AN IMPEDIMENT TO
TRADE IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Jay Dratler, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer software is a major item of trade today in the United
States and throughout the world. Estimates in 1984 of the value of
the worldwide market for computer software range from $10 billion
to $21 billion.1 This figure does not include the value of software
incorporated into equipment and machinery - an increasingly
common practice. Estimates of future software commerce indicate
a potential for enormous growth in both the dollar value and com-
mercial importance of software.2 Despite the growing commercial
importance of computer software, the American legal system has
not evolved an effective and efficient means of protecting and facili-
tating software commerce. For reasons described more fully below,
the three traditional pillars of intellectual property law - patents,
copyrights and trade secrets - are all peculiarly inappropriate for
protecting computer software and encouraging investment in re-
search and development without impeding everyday business and
the development of new channels of distribution.
Patents are difficult to obtain, expensive and time consuming.
Moreover, they do not protect some of the most important aspects
of software. Copyrights provide good protection for the expression
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1. See Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 74, 95 (SlO billion); Wall St. J., Monday, Oct. 8,
1984, at 23, col. 1 (S21 billion); S. McClellan, The Coming Computer Industry Shakeout:
Winners, Losers & Survivors (John Wiley & Sons 1984) at 238 [hereinafter referred to as
Shakeout].
2. See Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 75 (estimating $35 billion market by 1989); N.Y.
Times (Sunday ed.), Mar. 27, 1983, § 12, at 22; Shakeout, supra note I at 238 ($50 billion by
1988).
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of software in specific code in a particular computer language, but
they provide uncertain, if any, protection for the underlying ideas
and techniques. Trade secret law, which in theory can protect
ideas, techniques and algorithms that are not generally known, in
practice requires cumbersome and uncertain precautions for protec-
tion at each level of each distribution channel. The result of the
inability of the existing legal framework to accomodate software
comfortably is unjustified legal complexity and excessive transac-
tion costs, even in pedestrian business transactions. The state of the
law at present is such that almost every transaction requires a writ-
ten agreement drafted or negotiated by attorneys.
This article analyzes the state of the law protecting intellectual
property rights in computer software, discusses current business
practices used in attempting to deal with that body of law, and pro-
poses legislative solutions to facilitate commerce in software.
Although there are aspects of copyright law that impede fluid com-
merce in software, notably the first-sale doctrine discussed below,
this article focuses primarily on the problems associated with trade
secret law.
The second section of this article gives an overview of protec-
tion of computer software by patents, copyrights and trade secret
law. The third section discusses the significant gap in protection of
software between patents and copyrights. It then discusses how
trade secret law, albeit imperfectly, fills that gap. The fourth sec-
tion discusses the traditional requirements for trade secret protec-
tion, their applicability to computer software and their
inappropriateness to the software business as currently conducted.
The final section proposes legislative solutions to the problem of a
legal system that seems not to fit the needs of the software industry.
II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE
A. What is Software?
The most basic form of software3 is known as "binary code" or
"object code." 4 In this form, the computer instructions are repre-
3. The word "software" derives from the contrast between the intangible computer
program instructions and the tangible "hardware," that is, the physical computer and its
peripheral devices. To the author's knowledge, there is no standard legal or technical defini-
tion of "software," and its usage in practice depends upon context, custom and definitions in
particular written agreements. Sometimes the term includes paper documentation, and some-
times it does not.
4. For recent discussions of legal protection for software, see, e.g., Davidson, Protect-
ing Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 339, 340-48 (1983);
Russo, Do Boxtop Software Licenses Work?, 2 SOFTWARE PROTECTION 7 (Mar. 1984).
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sented as binary numbers, that is, a series of ones and zeros.' This
is the form in which the instructions are implemented in the com-
puter, the "ones" representing a closed switch or "on" state, and
the "zeros" representing an "open" switch or "off" state. Binary
code can be represented in both human-readable and machine-read-
able form. When printed in human-readable form, it is usually
translated into a more compact number system, such as octal, hex-
adecimal, or (less commonly) the decimal system used for ordinary
a-ithmetic.6
An important aspect of binary or object code is that, even in
human-readable form, it is intelligible to people only with great dif-
ficulty.7 In binary form, software consists only of a long string of
numbers, some of which represent computer instructions and some
of which represent the locations within the computer's memory
where data or computer instructions are stored. With no advance
knowledge of the software's nature or purpose, it may be difficult, if
not impossible, to decide which numbers represent instructions and
which represent memory locations, let alone to determine the grand
design of all the minute machine operations that the instructions
represent. While there are indications in the computer industry
that computer programs have been designed to perform this hercu-
lean task,' those programs by their nature would be specific to a
particular computer language and operating system, if not to a par-
5. "Binary" numbers are numbers to the base two. In this number system, each digit
to the left of the decimal point differs from its neighbor to its right by representings higher
power of two. For example, the binary number 1101 represents one times 20 (that is, 1) plus
zero times 21 plus one times 22 plus one times 23, for a total of 13 in decimal notation.
6. Octal numbers are numbers to the base eight, and hexadecimal are numbers to the
base sixteen. In conventional hexadecimal notation, single digits for the numbers ten through
fifteen are represented by the capital letters A through F, respectively. For example, the
decimal number 1984 is expressed in binary notation as 11111000000, in octal notation as
3700 and in hexadecimal notation as 7C0. Since the octal and hexadecimal number systems
are based upon powers of two, they have the advantage of easy conversion to and from binary
numbers, but they are more compact when printed than binary numbers, as the foregoing
examples show.
7. When printed, binary code consists of a huge block of ones and zeroes. In order to
interpret binary code, this block would have to be broken into individual numbers corre-
sponding to the instructions and memory locations that the numbers represent and then con-
verted into symbols that people can read, such as separated decimal numbers (or, for trained
programmers, octal or hexadecimal numbers) for the memory locations and letter-coded
mnemonics for the instructions that the binary codes represent. This process can be done by
hand, but it is sufficiently tedious to be prohibitively inefficient for all but the shortest
programs.
8. In allegations that certain IBM- compatible computer manufacturers had copied
International Business Machines Corporation's proprietary operating systems, IBM has
made very specific claims regarding the precise percentages of material that was copied.
These percentages could have been derived from statistical analysis, but may also have been
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ticular computer. In the general case, the use or conversion of ob-
ject code into a form that can be used by people for some purpose
other than execution in a computer system is a formidable task.
Besides object code, the other major form of software is
"source code." Source code is the original set of instructions for the
computer, written not in the binary language of computers, but in a
language designed to be used by people for computer programming.
There are many such "higher-level languages." 9 To the lay person,
statements in these languages look like stylized and abbreviated
English, punctuated by mathematical symbols. To computer pro-
grammers, these languages represent a means to write computer in-
structions in abbreviated and highly efficient form, subject to precise
rules of structure, usage and syntax. Software in source code form
is intended to be, and in fact is, intelligible to trained programmers.
Unlike object code, source code can be used to modify and improve
the software with relative ease. t°
Although intelligible to people and capable of being modified
by them, source code does not operate computers directly. Before
execution in a computer, source code must be converted into binary
or object code for execution. This conversion is accomplished by
computer systems running specialized computer programs designed
for this purpose. The source code is the "source" of the binary
machine instructions, which are derived from the source code
through translation by a computer system running special
programs.
There is a large number of programs intended to convert
derived from reverse compiling of binary code, followed by functional analysis of the result-
ing source code.
9. Among the most common higher-level languages are the following: FORTRAN
(short for "FORmula TRANslation"), used primarily for scientific and engineering applica-
tions requiring extensive algebraic computation; COBOL (for "COmmon Business Oriented
Language"), used primarily for business applications including data base and information
management; BASIC, a rudimentary language similar in some respects to FORTRAN, but
having the advantage of ease of learning by non-technical personnel; and the "C" language
developed by AT&T Bell Laboratories for use with its Unix operating system. Other com-
mon languages include ADA, developed and specified by the Department of Defense for
military and defense applications, PASCAL, an elegant language useful for computer science
and engineering research projects, and LISP (which has many dialects) for artificial intelli-
gence and expert system applications.
10. For example, a simple program in BASIC designed to add the integers from one to
ten and store the result in memory location "C", would read as follows:
10 C=O






source code into object code. The precise program used in conver-
sion is determined by the language in which the source code is writ-
ten and the computer and operating system under the control of
which the program is to be converted or run."1 Conversion pro-
grams generally fall into two categories. "Compilers" are stand-
alone programs that convert or "compile" source code into object
code for storage and execution at a later time. "Interpreters" are
programs that convert the source code to object code during opera-
tion of the program and, in effect, control the conversion process
and operation of the program while the program is being converted
and executed simultaneously. Most computer programs in use to-
day are, or have been, converted into object code through the use of
compilers. 12
The significance of the distinction between source code and ob-
ject code is best illustrated by an example of software distribution.
Suppose a software developer wishes to distribute its proprietary
operating system to various computer manufacturers, who will in
turn distribute the operating system, along with their computers, to
end users. Since the operating system was not designed for any par-
ticular manufacturer's computer, in most cases it must be adapted
to run on each manufacturer's special hardware.1 3 If the software
developer does not wish to perform this adaptation, it must provide
source code for the software to each computer manufacturer be-
11. Each model of central processing unit has its own "instruction set," that is, a set of
correspondences between binary numbers and the computer operations that the binary num-
bers represent. For example, in one model of central processing unit, a particular number
might represent the instruction for storing the contents of a central register in memory,
whereas in another brand of computer, that same number might represent the instruction for
adding the contents of a memory location to a central register. Each central processing unit
also must run under the control of an operating system. This is a fundamental computer
program that controls input and output operations, timing, operator monitoring and funda-
mental algebraic and logical operations for the computer. Since the object code produced by
any conversion program must be consistent with the computer's instruction set and operating
system, each conversion program must be designed for use with a particular instruction set
and particular operating system.
12. The majority of existing computer programs are written in FORTRAN or COBOL.
Although interpreters for these languages are available in some cases, historically these lan-
guages have used compilers. The majority of existing FORTRAN and COBOL programs in
use today were developed with the aid of compilers.
13. Since an operating system performs fundamental input, output and control func-
tions, it must be consistent with the instruction set of the microprocessor or other central
processing unit, as well as with the architecture of the computer and its peripherals. For
example, an operating system designed for use with Motorola's MC68000 microprocessor
chip will not work with a computer designed around Intel's 8086 microprocessor chip. If the
operating system is designed to be "portable," that is, adaptable to a number of different
hardware environments, however, it may be a simple matter to modify the operating system
to work with a new microprocessor or system architecture.
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cause the manufacturers will not be able to adapt and modify the
software using only object code. 4 In many cases, manufacturers
also may wish to have access to the source code so as to modify the
operating system to make it conform to future modifications and
improvements in their computers. As discussed below, the transfer
of source code to these manufacturers usually involves complex li-
censing restrictions to protect the software developer's proprietary
interests.15
In contrast, when the manufacturer distributes its computers
to end users along with the operating system, most end users do not
need to modify the operating system. In the typical case, the end
user simply uses the computer and operating system, and does not
modify them. Accordingly, the computer manufacturer, under li-
cense from the software developer, can distribute only object code
for the software to the end user without appreciably decreasing the
marketability of the software or the computer.
The software developer normally insists that the computer
manufacturer license the software only in object code form under
these circumstances. Since object code is difficult, if not impossible,
for people to understand and modify, an end user having only object
code will be unable to alter the software or discern the ideas, tech-
niques and algorithms that make it work. 6 Thus distribution of the
object code only provides practical protection of the software devel-
oper's proprietary interest at the end-user level, and may be an im-
portant element in providing legal protection as well.
The computer manufacturer, however, may wish to have the
right to distribute the software in source code form to customers
that want to modify or adapt the software by themselves, for exam-
ple, to keep it compatible with modifications of the manufacturer's
computer or to adapt it to other computer systems. The software
developer and computer manufacturer must resolve these conflict-
ing needs during negotiation of the license agreement. Of course,
the resolution of this issue depends on the nature of the software
and the computer and the needs of the marketplace, but the issue
14. Without source code the manufacturer wishing to adapt the software would not
know which portions of the software perform which functions. Therefore he would not be
able even to determine which portions require modification, let alone to do the modifications.
15. See infra pp. 50-51.
16. The end user would be able to understand and modify the software if the end user
knew in which language the software was written and had access to a reverse compiling
program for the end user's particular machine and operating system. In some cases, an end
user can perform simple modification of input or output routines using only object code. In
general, however, correction and modification of software without access to source code is
prohibitively expensive and time consuming.
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may be revisited later if an end user finds its needs cannot be met
under an existing license arrangement.
Whether distributed in object code or source code form, com-
puter software is easily copied. 7 Unless the software developer or
distributor takes technical precautions to prevent the software from
being copied, the software may be copied, in usable form, with the
aid of simple routines available on virtually any computer system.
Although the cost of copying depends upon the size of the computer
program and the recording medium, copying costs typically do not
exceed a few dollars. The time required to copy a program nor-
mally is only a few minutes and seldom exceeds an hour.' 8
Computer software thus is a valuable product that can be du-
plicated and stolen at minimal cost. Indeed, recent commentators
have estimated that as much as thirty or forty percent of the value
of software used in the United States today may be "bootleg"
software, copied and used without the authority of the owner. 9 To
protect their investments in research and development, most
software developers turn to technical means of protection and ulti-
mately to the law.
B. Patent Protection
Under American law, a patent provides the strongest protec-
tion of intellectual property. It grants an absolute monopoly to
make, use and sell the patented product or process for a period of
seventeen years.2 Unlike copyrights and trade secrets, it protects
against independent creation of the subject matter.2 In theory, the
sword and shield of patent protection would be useful tools to pro-
tect the investment and effort in development of software.
In practice, however, patent protection is inappropriate for
17. See Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy-
righted Works at 11 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as CONTU Report].
18. Copying time depends on the length of the program and the medium on which it is
recorded. Copying of floppy diskettes used for most microcomputer programs takes at most
a few minutes. With proper equipment, copying of major programs for mainframe computers
recorded on magnetic tape can be accomplished in less than half an hour.
19. See Wall St. J., Tuesday, Oct. 23, 1984, at 33.
20. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 154 (1982).
21. A copyright protects only against copying, not against independent creation of the
same material, or even copying from a common source in the public domain. See, e.g., Selle
v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. July 23, 1984); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 201[A] (1984). Trade secret law protects only against misappropriation of the trade secret
from its owner, not against independent creation or reverse engineering. See RESTATEMENT
OF ToRTs, § 757 (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr, §§ 2, 3; R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
§§ 2.05[2]; 504[11 (1984).
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computer software in most cases. Under a longstanding line of au-
thority affirmed repeatedly by the United States Supreme Court,
patents are not available for algorithms and mathematical formu-
lae.22 For example, in Gottschalk v. Benson,23 the Supreme Court
held that a commonly used algorithm for converting binary-coded
decimal numbers into binary numbers was not patentable. Algo-
rithms and mathematical formulae, however, are the essence of
most computer programs. The unique portions of any computer
program are primarily algorithms and techniques like the one dis-
cussed in Benson, some of which are generally known and some of
which are not.
This is not to say that no software is patentable. The Supreme
Court has never closed the door entirely on software patents. In
Diamond v. Diehr,24 the Court upheld a patent for a process for
curing rubber in which computer calculations of the precise time at
which to open the mold were the essential inventive element. More
recently, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. negotiated a
$1 million settlement of its claims that other brokerage houses had
infringed its patented cash management system.25 The Supreme
Court's decisions, however, have left considerable uncertainty
whether software is patentable by itself, that is, apart from a system
including hardware or a process involving significant "post-solu-
tion" activity.
In any event, legal uncertainty whether software is proper sub-
ject matter for patent protection is not the only problem with patent
protection for computer software. The patent system imposes high
standards of originality and inventiveness upon items subject to its
protection. In order to be eligible for patent protection, an inven-
tion must be both "new" - that is, not revealed in certain patents
and printed publications26 - and not "obvious" to an ordinary per-
son skilled in the art to which the subject matter pertains.27
These standards are inappropriate for computer software for
three reasons. First, due to the widespread use of computer
software and the rapid pace of its development, it is virtually impos-
sible to determine whether any particular twist or technique in com-
puter software is "new." Computer software is used and/or
22. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 71-72 (1972).
23. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
24. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
25. See Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
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developed by or for almost every business and industry in the
United States and throughout the world.28 Even if a centralized
library of all this material existed, it would be a prodigious task to
search all exemplars of a particular type of software to determine
whether a particular algorithm used in it was "new."
Secondly, most of the original content of computer software
consists of small step-by-step advances, which are generally too
small to meet the statutory standard of inventiveness, or the use of
known algorithms in new ways or to solve new problems - an ap-
plication not eligible for patent protection under black letter patent
law.2 9 Nevertheless, the development of computer software de-
mands massive investment in human effort and money3" which
would not be made without some form of reliable legal protection
from piracy.
Finally, the task of determining whether a particular new twist
in computer software is "nonobvious" is metaphysical at best. The
"nonobviousness" standard, originally developed for patents on
mechanical devices, has caused more than one judge to throw up his
hands in assessing chemical and electronic claims.3" The task is all
the more difficult in a field governed by purely abstract mathemati-
cal invention, in which many small ingenious advances are made by
many people every day, but those advances are likely to be classified
as mathematical formulae or procedures that are not appropriate
subject matter for patent protection. Thus in the field of computer
software it is easy to confuse the distinct legal issues of what is pat-
entable subject matter and what advances within a generally patent-
able field are nonobvious enough to merit a patent.
28. For a good discussion of the widespread use of computer software in business and
industry, see Bus. WEEK, Feb. 27, 1984, at 74.
29. See supra note 22.
30. A computer program is like an elaborate instruction manual intended to communi-
cate with machines, rather than with people. Its value lies not in the uniqueness or "nonobvi-
ousness" of its design, but in the fact that it was designed at all. Although not requiring great
ingenuity or genius, the writing and debugging of computer programs does require intensive
human effort, often measured in person-years. Without protection from piracy, there would
be no incentive for business to incur the expense to underwrite this effort. Once a program is
properly written, however, its value lies in its ability to perform mathematical calculations or
to manipulate information with a speed and accuracy that could not be achieved by unaided
human effort.
31. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911) (L. Hand, J.), affid in part and rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) ("How long we
shall continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative scientific
assistance in the administration of justice no one knows..."); Picard v. United Aircraft
Corp. 128 F.2d 632, 639 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., concurring), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942)
(Patent affairs need "the judgment of men who are experts in science.").
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A further reason why patent protection is not appropriate for
computer software is that it is too expensive and slow. One reason
for the rapid development of the software industry is that it is labor-
intensive but requires little capital equipment. 32 Many advances in
software have been made by professors, students or children using
inexpensive personal computers or time-sharing systems with little
capital investment.33 For these individuals, the cost of patent filing
and maintenance fees is significant,34 and the cost of legal fees for
prosecution of a patent through several office actions in most cases
would be prohibitive.35
As for speed, delays in achieving patent protection often ex-
ceed the useful lifetime of software products. For example, it is not
uncommon for uncontested patent applications to take two years to
prosecute, 36 and any patent interference action may add signifi-
cantly to that delay.37 Much software, however, becomes obsolete
in seven years,38 and, in the mushrooming and highly competitive
32. Programmers can buy time on sophisticated university or commercial time-sharing
computers at reasonable rates. Today, personal computers are available for home use at
modest cost. For example, a personal computer having hard-disk storage and higher-level
language capability costs less than $5,000.
33. See, e.g., Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 77 (Ashton-Tate, a well-known software de-
veloper and distributor, founded on $7,500); FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 1984, at 200 (teacher and
part-time music composer writes successful software); ELECTRONICS, June 16, 1983, at 54
(UPI network software developed by graduate student); INFOWORLD, Feb. 6, 1984, at 82
(discussion of professionals from noncomputer fields as amateur programmers).
34. For individuals, small businesses and nonprofit organizations, the patent filing fee is
a minimum of $150, but it can be considerably higher, depending upon the nature of the
patent claims. The patent issue fee is $250. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16, 1.18 (1984). Maintenance fees
for individuals, small businesses and nonprofit organizations are $200, $400 and $600, due at
the end of the fourth, eighth and twelfth years after the patent issues, respectively. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.20 (1984). If the software developer is the user of a $5,000 personal computer,
filing, issue and maintenance fees alone will exceed one-third of the developer's capital invest-
ment in the software business.
35. Patent prosecution fees of course depend upon the nature of the patentable inven-
tion, the state of the prior art and the response of the patent examiner. However, fees of
competent attorneys for a patent search, analysis of the patent search, initial drafting of the
patent application (including draftpersons' fees for drawings), and response to the examiner's
first office action are unlikely to be much less than $5,000. Thus, the hypothetical entrepre-
neur with a $5,000 personal computer would have to commit to doubling his capital invest-
ment in the business simply to attempt patenting a computer program, without any guarantee
that a patent would issue, or, if issued, would be enforceable.
36. In August 1984, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Gerald J. Mossinghoff
stated that it took slightly more than two years, on the average, to get a patent. The Patent
and Trademark Office's goal is to reduce this by two months in each of the next three years to
achieve an eighteen-month average delay by 1987. 28 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) No. 692, at 436 (Aug. 16, 1984).
37. A 1982 study showed that the average duration of patent interference actions was
two years, but some took more than nine years. 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 699, 700 (1983).
38. The author's clients generally recognize a seven-year "rule of thumb" for software
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personal computer software industry, products may lose their pri-
mary value in an even shorter time.39
The final reason why patent protection is not appropriate for
software is that patents are difficult to enforce. The bulk of the vast
amount of computer software used in the world is hidden in mag-
netic media and computer storage systems. There is no practical
way for a software vendor to determine whether any particular user,
or even a large class of users, possesses or is using "bootleg" copies
of that vendor's software. Under these circumstances, most ven-
dors are reluctant to explain how their software operates in a patent
application which, although kept secret during the application pro-
cess,' is required by law to be disclosed to the public once the pat-
ent issues.4 ' For many vendors, the "enabling disclosure"'42 that
becomes part of the public records of the Patent and Trademark
Office is tantamount to a license for piracy.
C. Copyright
Of the three traditional pillars of intellectual property protec-
tion, copyright is the most appropriate for computer software. It
protects against copyng - that is, direct piracy - without prohibit-
obsolescence. The useful lifetime of a particular piece of software, however, depends upon
the nature of the software and the machine on which it is designed to operate. Operating
systems designed for particular machines will have the same useful lifetime as the machines
themselves. Moreover, some fundamental programs have relatively long lifetimes. For ex-
ample, variants of the original FORTRAN compilers developed in the 1950s are still in use.
39. Short lifetimes are the general rule in the personal computer industry due to rapid
advances in both hardware and software. For example, the well-known spreadsheet program
"VisiCalc," the first spreadsheet program and one of the most successful programs for per-
sonal computers, was first introduced in 1979 and by 1984 was losing significant market share
to more versatile programs containing other applications software in addition to spreadsheets,
such as Lotus 1-2-3. See Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 88. Less successful programs, as well as
those in fields crowded with competition, often have even shorter marketing lives. See
Shakeout supra note 1 at 269 (commercial viability of typical personal computer software is
about one year).
40. The patent statutes require that the disclosures in patent applications be kept secret
until the patent issues. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982). This allows the patent applicant to main-
tain trade secret protection for the subject matter of the invention if a patent does not issue.
If a patent issues, the disclosure becomes accessible to the public in the files of the Patent and
Trademark Office, and anyone is permitted to practice the invention after the end of the
patent term.
41. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-
81 (1974).
42. The disclosure included in the public records of the Patent and Trademark Office is
called an "enabling disclosure" because it is required by statute to contain sufficient informa-
tion to permit a person having ordinary knowledge and skill in the art to which the patent
pertains to practice the invention using information contained in the disclosure. See 35
U.S.C. § 112.
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•ing independent creation and thereby "chilling" development of the
industry. Although certain technical requirements of copyright
protection may be cumbersome, copyright protection is in one sense
automatic, and full protection is cheap and easy to obtain. Indeed,
in one sense copyright protection is overkill, for its duration - fifty
years at a minimum 43 -is significantly longer than the foreseeable
useful life of most computer software in operation today.
Nevertheless, copyright protection has significant gaps that
makes its coverage of software incomplete. First, based on the line
of authority beginning with the seminal decision of Baker v. Sel-
den,' and confirmed in the language of Section 102(b) of the Copy-
right Act,4" copyright protects only expression, and not the
underlying ideas. Since software is designed to operate machines,
however, its expression is not as important as its underlying func-
tion, that is, the ideas expressed in the code.
The underlying function is, of course, protected indirectly by
copyright to the extent that copyright protects not only against ver-
batim copying, but also against substantial copying of organization,
theme, incident, sequence and detail.46 But pure ideas, algorithms
and mathematical procedures are not traditionally the subject of
copyright,47 and it is doubtful that courts would or should protect
them under the aegis of copyright, especially if they can be ex-
pressed in only a limited number of ways48 or are expressed in a
43. For copyrights owned by individual authors, the term of protection is the author's
lifetime plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). For anonymous and pseudonymous
works and works made for hire, the term of protection is seventy-five years from first publica-
tion or one hundred years from creation of the work, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(c) (1982).
44. 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 1.10[B][2],
2.03[D] (1984).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
46. Copyright protection varies along a spectrum ranging from full protection of exact
expression at one end, to no protection for fundamental ideas, methods and processes at the
other. Between these two extremes, the degree of copying of organization, theme, incident,
sequence and detail must be examined according to the "levels of abstraction" test enunciated
by Judge Learned Hand in two famous copyright decisions: Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-56 (2d Cir. 1936); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B][2]
(1984).
47. See supra sources cited in note 44.
48. If the number of ways in which a certain function can be expressed is too limited,
however, copyright protection may be weak or nonexistent. The copyright laws do not per-
mit an author to preempt ideas or functionality that are capable of expression in only a
limited number of ways by retaining exclusive rights in one or more of the limited ways of
expression. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1168 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley 253 F.2d 702, 704-06 (2nd Cir.
1958).
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form different from that of the original, for example, by translation
into a different computer language using a different computer oper-
ating system with different architecture and different instruction se-
quences. Since functional ideas and their elaboration constitute one
of the chief and most difficult objectives of software development,
copyright alone can never be more than a half measure of protec-
tion for the software developer.
The second reason why relying solely on copyright protection
is terrifying for software vendors is the "first-sale" docrtine.
49
Under this doctrine, enshrined in Section 109 of the Copyright
Act,5 0 anyone who owns a copy of a copyrighted work has the right
to sell, transfer, lease and otherwise dispose of that copy at his dis-
cretion, without accounting to the copyright owner. Literally inter-
preted, this provision would permit a business, without the
permission of software developers, to buy copies of their software
and rent them out to users on a short-term basis, who would then
have the opportunity, if not the right, to make bootleg copies for
their own use.
To avoid this situation, software developers usually distribute
their software only pursuant to written licenses that contain certain
protective provisions. Some software licenses state explicitly that
the end user does not obtain ownership of the copy but only a li-
cense to use it. Other license agreements obligate the end user not
to transfer or sublicense his copy of the software, attempting to con-
travene by contract the permission granted by the statute. Such
contractual provisions are currently the subject of a legal action in
the Northern District of California,51 whose outcome may depend
on the enforceablility of "box top" software licenses unsigned by the
end user.
Retention of ownership of the copy is problematic in light of
the facts that the end user retains possession of the copy and that
many states have statutory and common-law policies against re-
straints on alienation of personal property. 52 Contractual prohibi-
tions against transfer and sublicensing of the copy are sounder
49. This doctrine holds that the copyright owner legally loses control over copies of the
copyrighted work after the first sale of a copy to a purchaser. As long as the purchaser does
not make additional copies of that work the purchaser is free to deal with the copy purchased
as he or she wishes. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[B][1] (1984).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1978).
51. Micropro Int'l Corp. v. United Computer Corp. (N.D. Cal. C-83-3019-WWS 1984);
see also Russo, supra note 4.
52. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 711; 14 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1629 at 11 (3d ed.
1972).
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because the legislative history of the Copyright Act indicates that
contractual restrictions on the statutory permission are valid,
although they may not be enforced by copyright infringement reme-
dies.53 Nevertheless, both protections rely upon an enforceable
agreement between the copyright owner and the end user, and this
agreement may be unenforceable where, as often occurs in personal
computer industry, it is an unsigned agreement that the end user
reads only after purchasing and preparing to use the software
product. 4
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the arguments pro
and con enforceability of "box top" software licenses. Suffice it to
say that the issue has generated enough uncertainty and concern to
result in the passage of corrective legislation in Louisiana and the
preparation of a similar bill in California. 5 The salient fact is that
the first-sale doctrine, in the view of most software vendors and
their attorneys, requires significant modification by contract in or-
der to permit business to be done in the ordinary course where
software is concerned.
Finally, a number of the technical requirements of the Ameri-
can Copyright Act are inappropriate and cumbersome as applied to
computer software. Copyright notices are required on "published"
works, not on "unpublished" works.56 It is difficult, however, to
determine whether a particular copy of software has been "pub-
lished." If software is distributed widely on diskette without any
accompanying license, "publication" might be an appropriate con-
cept. However, this is seldom done. In most cases, software is dis-
tributed under written license agreement to a limited group of users
- that is, to users who have the necessary computer equipment and
operating system on which the software runs. Is this "publication"?
This question has no answer. Any attempt to draw the line based
on the number of copies distributed would have the absurd result,
under the current Copyright Act, that a vendor who began distribu-
tion to a limited group without using a copyright notice would have
to try to put notices on all previously distributed copies after distri-
bution reached a certain level.57
53. See H. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) at 79.
54. See generally, Russo, supra note 4, for a discussion of the enforceability of "box
top" software licenses.
55. See Computer Software License Enforcement Act, Act No. 744 (1984), LOUISIANA
REV. STAT. 51:191-56; COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 10, 1984, at 27 (plans of Assemblyman
Gray Davis to introduce similar legislation in California).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1978). See also 17 U.S.C. § 402 (1978) (phonorecords).
57. Once a work is "published" under the Copyright Act, it should contain copyright
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A second set of technical requirements that are inappropriate
for computer software consists of the requirements for registration
and deposit.5 8 These requirements are inappropriate for two rea-
sons. First, most software is constantly modified in the process of
marketing and distribution, especially in the early stages of develop-
ment. Modifications are required to fix "bugs," to maintain com-
patibility with changing hardware and operating systems, and to
adapt to new hardware and operating system environments. Tech-
nically, the Copyright Act requires that each new version with sig-
nificant original material be registered as a separate work, but this is
administratively impractical. 9
Secondly, the Copyright Office's requirement for deposit of
source code in the public records6 ° has raised the specter of piracy.
The Copyright Office has promulgated interim rules permitting de-
posit of identifying materials only and is in the process of develop-
ing a final rule.6" Even this reduced requirement, however, appears
to be futile in light of the Copyright Office's own admission that: (1)
it cannot store or retain all the material it receives; (2) it cannot
verify whether what is deposited is original material; and (3) to the
extent the identifying material does not expose significant portions
of software, the deposit does not serve its obvious purpose of acting
notices. If notices are omitted from more than "a relatively small number of copies" of the
work distributed under the authority of the copyright owner, the copyright owner must regis-
ter the work within five years after publication and make reasonable effort to add the notice
to copies distributed without notice. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(2) (1978).
58. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 407-412 (1978).
59. Infringement actions cannot be maintained until after the copyright in the allegedly
infringed work is registered. 17 U.S.C. § 411. In addition, statutory damages and attorneys'
fees are not available in an action for acts of infringement occurring before registration, ex-
cept during a three-month grace period immediately after first publication. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 412.
60. See generally Wilbur, Copyright Registration for Secret Computer Programs: Rob-
ber of the Phoenix's Nest, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 357 (1984). The Copyright Office will accept
object code for deposit, but only subject to the "rule of doubt." See 48 Fed. Reg. 22951,
22952 (May 23, 1983). A letter invoking the "rule of doubt" attached to the registration
certificate issued by the Copyright Office, as a practical matter, undermines the value of the
registration certificate in litigation. For a "clean" registration unsullied by the "rule of
doubt," the Copyright Office requires deposit of source code for at least portions of a com-
puter program. See id.; 37 C.F.R. § 202(c)(2)(vii) (1983).
61. The existing rule requires deposit of the first and' last twenty-five pages of source
code for a computer program. See 17 C.F.R. § 202(c)(2)(vii) (1983). The Copyright Office
has an informal policy that certain lesser amounts of source code may be submitted in con-
nection with a registration not subject to the "rule of doubt." Copyright Office, COMPUTER
PROGRAM PRACTICES OF THE EXAMINING DIVISION (Internal Policy Manual, rev. 9/83) at
389. The Copyright Office has requested comment on an appropriate rule for protection of
trade secrets in computer software, see 48 Fed. Reg. 22951-53 (May 23, 1983); and the devel-
opment of that rule is in progress. See 48 Fed. Reg. 37232 (Aug. 17, 1983) (extension of
comment period).
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as an evidentiary basis for copyright infringement actions. 62 The
requirement, however, does impose a burden upon software devel-
opers in the form of administrative expense and the attorneys' fees
they must pay to determine which portions of the code can or must
be submitted to maintain copyright protection without risking un-
due exposure of underlying trade secrets.63
D. Trade Secrets
Although the technical requirements of copyright protection
are burdensome, they can be satisfied through the implementation
of appropriate procedures, albeit at added administrative and legal
expense. The major deficiency of copyright protection is not its
technical requirements, but its failure to protect ideas. This fact is
responsible for the increasing attention that lawyers representing
software developers have paid to trade secret protection over the
last several years," despite the increasing weight that the courts
have given to the principles of software protection under copy-
right.65 For it is the ideas that are technically ineligible for copy-
right protection - the algorithms, mathematical formulae,
calculational procedures, methods and techniques - that are the
essence of computer programming. Moreover, these ideas are not
well protected by copyright because they often can be expressed in a
number of different ways and their expression can be transferred
from one -form to another easily - often by machine.
In order to protect those elements of computer software that
are not eligible for copyright protection, vendors must invoke the
law of trade secrets. A "trade secret" is any
62. See 48 Fed. Reg. 32775, 32776 (July 19, 1983) (Copyright Office "currently faces a
storage crisis").
63. Rearranging the sequence of the computer program itself to preserve trade secrets
might be viewed as an improper practice, weakening the copyright registration or leading to
unfavorable inferences in litigation. The Copyright Office's informal interim rules, however,
provide three alternative means for making a deposit. See supra note 61. One of these means
permits the copyright owner to obliterate up to 50% of certain required deposit material.
Thus the choice of means, as well as the choice of material to delete if this particular means is
chosen, gives the copyright owner some discretion concerning what to disclose.
64. Until two years ago, many large computer vendors protected object code for their
computer programs almost entirely by copyright. In early 1983, IBM announced restrictions
on distribution of source code for its operating systems and other computer programs and
began to include covenants against reverse engineering of object code in its software licenses.
See ELECTRONIC NEws, Feb. 1, 1983, at 1. Following IBM's lead, most of the computer
industry is now paying greater attention to protection of trade secrets in computer software in
both source code and object code forms.
65. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v, Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); GCA
Corp. v. Chance, C-82-1063-MHP, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of man-
ufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a
machine or other device, or a list of customers.66
According to this definition, almost any aspect of the computer pro-
gram, including the underlying ideas and the entire program itself,
is eligible for trade secret protection. Only three requirements must
be met: (1) the protected element must have competitive value; (2) it
must not be generally known to the public or (although this is less
certain) to the computer industry; and (3) the owner must take rea-
sonable steps to keep it secret.67
At first blush, trade secret doctrine would appear to have a
number of significant advantages for computer software protection.
First, the scope of protection is very broad. Almost anything can
qualify as a trade secret, according to the Restatement of Torts,
except transitory information such as a market price or a particular
quote or bid.68 Thus the software developer might protect as a
trade secret an algorithm, a computational procedure, a subroutine,
or an entire computer program. Secondly, like copyright protec-
tion, trade secret protection does not prohibit independent creation
and therefore erects no barriers to further development of the
software industry.6 9 Thirdly, trade secret protection has potentially
infinite duration; it lasts as long as its subject matter is kept secret
and is not generally known.70 Finally, no special legal procedure or
application to a government agency is necessary to secure trade se-
cret protection. Provided the proper measures are taken to insure
secrecy, protection subsists from the moment the trade secret is tlis-
covered or implemented. There are no filing fees, administrative
routines or legal expenses required to obtain protection of a particu-
lar trade secret, although administrative and legal expenses may be
incurred in implementing and maintaining a program for the pro-
tection of trade secrets in general,7 ' or in enforcing rights in any
66. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
67. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975); University
Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Dickerman As-
soc., Inc. v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co., Civ. Action No. 82-356-Z slip op. (D. Mass., Feb. 17,
1984).
68. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
69. See supra note 21.
70. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939); 2 R. MILGRIM, TRADE
SECRETS, § 9.03[4][c] (1984).
71. In order to protect its trade secrets, a business must take reasonable effort under the
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particular trade secret. Given all these advantages, trade secret pro-
tection would appear to fill the considerable gap left by patent and
copyright protection at insubstantial cost to the software developer
and vendor.
III. DIFFICULTIES WITH TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
A. Filling the Gap
As discussed in the previous section, the three traditional pil-
lars of intellectual property law do not support a protective roof for
computer software. Copyright protection - in some ways the most
appropriate form of protection for computer programs - protects
only the expression of mathematical ideas in particular code, not
the underlying ideas and procedures.7" This protection is generally
insufficient, for it is nearly always possible to express the underlying
procedures and ideas in many different ways. Indeed, since com-
puter programs are written in highly stylized form and may be han-
dled by machines, it may be possible to write computer programs
that would translate, reorganize and modify other computer pro-
grams automatically in such a way that copyright infringement
would be difficult to detect, if not to prosecute as a matter of law.
Thus copyright does not protect the functional aspects of computer
programs that are their most important elements.
On the other hand, patent law, the traditional domain of pro-
tection of function, is inaccessible to most software vendors due to
the high standards of protection and the expense and delay involved
in obtaining patents.73 Those who invest in research and develop-
ment in computer software would like all of their computer pro-
grams protected, not just those, or elements of those, that satisfy the
high standards of novelty and nonobviousness necessary to obtain a
patent. Moreover, the underlying mathematical ideas and algo-
rithms, if not entire programs, are unpatentable.74 If one adds to
these uncertainties the poor batting average of patents when their
validity is challenged in court75 and the necessity for revealing all to
circumstances to maintain secrecy. Most businesses have trade secret programs reviewed by
counsel and higher management. These programs prescribe and implement such precautions
as security guards, visitors' permits, plant access restrictions, locked areas and file cabinets,
document classification and destruction and restraints on technical publication in order to
preserve trade secrets.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1978).
73. See supra pp. 36-37.
74. See supra pp. 34-35.
75. Depending upon the forum, the majority of patents are invalidated on one ground
or another when challenged in court. See FORBES, Sept. 10, 1983, at 163.
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the public at large when a patent issues," it is not surprising that
few software vendors seek patent protection for their programs.
Since copyright protection does not apply to ideas or algo-
rithms and patents are of little help in practice, trade secret protec-
tion must fill the gap. By now, most software vendors have
recognized the need for trade secrecy as an adjunct to copyright
protection. Yet, despite the advantages enumerated above, trade se-
cret law is an imperfect tool that often impedes, rather than aids,
the flow of commerce in software.
B. The Paradox of "Secret Software"
The primary difficulty with trade secret law as applied to
software is that it is a contradiction in terms. Trade secrets tradi-
tionally have been specific formulae, processes, or items of informa-
tion that are kept carefully locked within a plant or business and
never see the light of day. On the other hand, a software marketer's
primary goal is to market and distribute his software as far and as
wide as possible. This paradox is reflected in several unresolved
legal issues relating to trade secret protection for software.
The first troublesome issue is the question of "publication."
Traditional trade secret principles hold that, once a secret is "pub-
lished," it thereby becomes known to the general public and legal
protection is lost.77 Yet most software developers distribute their
software as widely as possible for profit and, in so doing, advertise
that they will supply their software to anyone who wants it. More-
over, in order to be sure that copyright protection is not lost, most
software developers affix copyright notices to copies of their
software that they distribute. Since copyright notices are required
only on works that are "published" within the meaning of the
Copyright Act,7" one can argue that affixation of a copyright notice
is an implied admission that the software has been published.79
Use of a copyright notice, however, does not necessarily imply
publication of software, even for purposes of the Copyright Act.
The Copyright Act does not prohibit the use of the copyright notice
76. See supra p. 37 & note 42.
77. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT,
§ l(d)(1) (1979); R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.05(1] (1984).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1978).
79. This argument, however has not fared well in the courts. See, e.g., Technicon Medi-
cal Info. Sys. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032, 1036-39 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 74 L. Ed. 2d 955 (1983); M. Bryce & Assoc., Inc. v. Gladstone, 319 N.W. 2d 907, 913
(Wis. 1982).
1985]
46 COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
on unpublished works,8" and software vendors are well advised to
include copyright notices even on unpublished works to preserve
their copyright in the event that a court later decides there has been
publication. Moreover, the scope of "publication" for copyright
purposes is not the same as the scope of "becoming publicly
known" for puposes of loss of trade secret protection. At least two
courts have upheld trade secret protection for distributed software
on this ground."
Nevertheless, there remains the question whether widely-dis-
tributed software is or should be entitled to trade secret protection.
Under current law, the answer is uncertain. In one case, a court
upheld trade secret protection for design information in confidential
minicomputer maintenance manuals that the defendant claimed
were distributed to almost six thousand persons.82 This number,
however, is small compared to the customer lists of many software
vendors. In any event, the precise number should have little bear-
ing upon whether the software has become generally known in the
industry so that trade secret protection has been lost.
Suppose that there are one thousand potential users of a given
software package, and that all but one have received and paid for
the package under license from the vendor. Assuming that the one
thousand users define the relevant industry, the software would be
generally distributed within that industry if the word "generally"
has any meaning. Nevertheless, it would be both unfair and eco-
nomically unsound83 for the last potential user to be permitted to
use the software without paying the vendor the license fee that all
other users in the industry have paid. Thus, for software that is
licensed and not sold, the principle that trade secret protection is
lost when something becomes distributed should not apply, unless
the words "generally distributed" are construed to mean "distrib-
uted to all" under these circumstances.
More fundamentally, one can argue that having been generally
distributed should not be construed as being generally known where
licensed software is concerned. The rule against trade secret protec-
tion for general knowledge is designed to prevent claims of exclu-
80. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 4.01, 4.04 (1984).
81. Supra note 79.
82. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 107-8, 110-
11 (Del. Ch. 1975).
83. Not only would the last potential user be gezting a "free ride," but such a rule
would encourage all potential users to delay licensing the software, or perhaps even to in-
fringe, in the hope that they would be held to be among the lucky few who did not have to
pay for a license.
[Vol. I
TRADE SECRET LAW
sive property rights in what lies in the public domain. When
software is licensed, however, it is not the ideas and underlying
technology in the software that are licensed but the right to use the
software. When a vendor licenses the use of a computer program
containing a clever algorithm for computing accounts receivable,
for example, he does not intend ordinarily to permit the licensee to
use that algorithm to construct another program, but rather to per-
mit the licensee only to use that algorithm in the vendor's program
to calculate accounts receivable. Accordingly, the dilemma regard-
ing the degree to which widespread licensing may occur before
trade secret protection is lost can be resolved by recognizing that it
is not the trade secrets themselves that are licensed, but their use.84
Whether the law will make this fine distinction, however, re-
mains to be seen. In the interim, owners of software must tolerate
considerable uncertainty and, if legal protection is desired, must ne-
gotiate appropriate licensing agreements at every stage of the distri-
bution chain, as discussed below. 5
C. Reverse Engineering
As mentioned above,86 one of the methods that software dis-
tributors often use to protect their proprietary interests in software
is "object-code-only" licensing. Under this scheme of licensing, the
vendor distributes recording media containing only object code and
makes all modifications and corrections to the software itself, using
the source code that only it retains. This form of licensing has two
effects. First, since object code is difficult, if not impossible, to un-
derstand and modify, it provides practical, technical protection
against misuse of the software and the ideas hidden in the object
code. Secondly, because object code is difficult, if not impossible, to
understand by itself, this form of licensing might provide some legal
protection. The software vendor could argue that, by releasing ob-
ject code only, it has taken all reasonable steps necessary to protect
the ideas and trade secrets embedded in the software.
Under current law, object-code-only licensing should not pro-
vide legal protection against the lawful owner of a copy of the
software in the absence of contractual prohibitions against reverse
84. This recognition is fundamental to an appreciation of the role of software in intel-
lectual property. Software's value differs from that of most copyrighted works because it
inheres not in what the software communicates to people, but in the functionality of the
software in controlling machine processing. In this sense, software is less like a copyrighted
instruction manual and more like the subject matter of a patent.
85. See infra pp. 50-52.
86. See supra pp. 31-33.
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engineering. Black letter trade secret law allows the owner of per-
sonal property to examine, dissect and disassemble it in any manner
and to use freely any information obtained in so doing. 87  The
source of this doctrine is the notion that the owner of property
should be able to treat it in any way he or she chooses.
Application of this doctrine does not end the matter, however.
If an end user is a licensee of the software, and not an owner of a
copy of it, the license agreement should control. At least, the end
user should have no more right to reverse engineer and use the ideas
in the software than are explicitly granted in the license. To this
extent, the law of trade secrets is analogous to the "first-sale" doc-
trine in copyright law,8" under which the issue of ownership of a
copy determines the rights of the user freely to dispose of or lease
that copy. The Copyright Act's legislative history permits the effect
of ownership of a copy of the software to be varied by contract.89
Over the past year or two, many large software vendors have
attempted to take a similar tack with respect to trade secrets by
inserting in their written license agreements prohibitions against re-
verse engineering, reverse compiling, and disassembling the
software."0 There appears to be no good reason why these prohibi-
tions should not be enforceable under contract law, just as the
Copyright Act permits enforcement of contractual prohibitions or
limitations on a copy owner's transfer and licensing rights. The en-
forceability of these prohibitions, however, would be conditioned
upon existence of a valid contract - a prerequisite not necessarily
present when "box top" licenses are used. 91
Enforceability of contractual restrictions on reverse engineer-
87. See, e.g., Colony Corp. v. Crown Glass Corp., 430 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ill. App. 1981);
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc. 358 N.E.2d 804, 807 (Mass. 1976); A. F. Holden
Co. v. O'Brien, 73 U.S.P.Q. 481 (E.D. Pa. 1947); see generally, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 comment a (1939); R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.05(2) (1984); Grogan, Decompi-
lation and Disassembly: Undoing Software Protection, 1 THE COMPUTER LAW. 1 (1984).
88. See supra pp. 38-39.
89. See supra p. 40.
90. Although a number of smaller vendors have done this on the advice of counsel for
several years, IBM was the first of the major computer vendors to include these clauses in its
agreements. Supra note 64.
91. The enforceability of "box top" software licenses under state law generally depends
on the circumstances under which the software is furnished. If the licensee has an opportu-
nity to read and review the license before the licensing transaction is completed, the "box
top" license may be enforceable. Under some circumstances common in commercial prac-
tice, however, the license agreement remains hidden until the licensing transaction is com-
pleted and the licensee unpacks the software and/or hardware to begin using it. Under these
circumstances, there are strong arguments why the "box top" license should not be enforced.
See generally, Russo, supra note 4.
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ing is not only consistent with the outline of current copyright law,
but appears to be good policy. Growth and development in the
software industry are rampant; barriers to entry appear to be low.92
There is no good reason to permit a licensee of software to make use
of the licensor's trade secrets buried in the object code by reverse
engineering that code if the license is explicitly restricted to use
only. Moreover, if programs that reverse compile object code do
exist, they are likely in the hands of only the largest and most so-
phisticated software houses. Invalidating restrictions on reverse en-
gineering would benefit only these large businesses and increase
concentration in the industry. In any event, the protection of con-
tractual prohibitions on reverse engineering require negotiation as
part of the license agreement; otherwise the software licensor is sub-
ject to the uncertain application of the common law.
D. "'Reasonable Steps"
A final area of uncertainty in the application of trade secret law
to software is the question of what reasonable measures must be
taken to preserve trade secrets in the process of licensing and distri-
bution. Traditional trade secret law provides that whatever steps
are taken must be reasonable under the circumstances. 93 Unfortu-
nately, this general standard is sufficently vague to create considera-
ble uncertainty, and the uncertainty often causes software lawyers
to take conservative positions in license negotiations.
License agreements typically contain one or more of three stan-
dards for nondisclosure of trade secrets. First, there may be an ab-
solute requirement that the software be kept confidential and not
disclosed. Secondly, the licensee may be obligated to use "best ef-
forts" or "reasonable efforts" to preserve secrecy. Finally, the licen-
see may be required to use the same care in handling the licensed
software as it uses in handling its own software. Often, the second
or third standard are imposed together, in the conjunctive.
Whatever verbal formula is used, its legal effect may depend
upon the circumstances. For example, if a vendor imposes the
92. As discussed above, see p. 36, supra, capital investment required for entry is mini-
mal. This may be changing, however, at least in the consumer software marketplace. Recent
reports indicate that substantial advertising expenditure may be necessary successfully to
market products for personal computers. FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 1981, at 59 (for the larger
vendors of software for personal computers, marketing is now single largest expense, exceed-
ing research and development); Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 74, 77 (requirement for large
advertising budgets has become barrier to entry into microcomputer software business).
93. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a (1939); UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § l(d)(2) (1979); R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.04 (1984).
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"same care" standard upon a major, sophisticated software devel-
oper, that may be sufficient to preserve trade secrecy. However, it
may not be sufficient if the software vendor knows that the licensee
has a policy of not maintaining adequate protection of software that
it licenses from others, or that the licensee is an unsophisticated new
entrant to the software business that does not have trade secret pro-
tection measures in place.9
4
Although the "reasonable care" standard should be adequate
in most cases, it may be insufficient if the licensor knows that the
licensee has a history or policy of inadequate care. Even the abso-
lute obligation to maintain secrecy may not be enough if the licensee
flouts that obligation and the licensor takes no remedial action.
Since all of these circumstances are to be reviewed by a court after
the fact, there can be little certainty regarding trade secret protec-
tion under any standard. As a consequence, many software lawyers
negotiate hard for the highest standard, and some even seek indem-
nification for breach of the standard of care.
E. Licensing Negotiations
The result of all this uncertainty can be a complex chain of
lengthy and interlocking license negotiations. For example, con-
sider the situation discussed above in which an operating system
developer licenses the operating system in source code form to man-
ufacturers of computers that distribute the operating system in ob-
ject code form with their computers. If the operating system
vendor is distributing the source code for its major product, it nor-
mally will treat that code like the "family jewels" and attempt to
impose stringent restrictions on use and disclosure upon the manu-
facturers. These restrictions may include an individual, signed con-
fidentiality agreement with each employee of each manufacturer
who has access to the source code.
For the reasons discussed above, the vendor also will wish to
control to some extent licensing at the second level from the manu-
facturer to the end users. For example, to preserve its trade secrets,
it will wish to control the standard of care imposed upon the end
user to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the software. In addi-
tion, it may wish to force the manufacturers to include in end-user
licenses prohibitions against reverse engineering of the object code 95
94. Since the test is what is reasonable under the circumstances, a court could find that
the vendor's knowledge of the licensee's inadequate protective procedures or general naivete
in business matters made reliance on the "same care" standard unreasonable.
95. See supra pp. 47-49.
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and, to avoid application of the first-sale doctrine, restrictions on
transfer and licensing or statements that the end user is not the
owner of a copy.96
The manufacturer, of course, will resist the imposition of these
conditions for several reasons. First, the manufacturer already may
have form license agreements in place that it does not wish to
change because changes would entail additional printing and ad-
ministrative expenses and might generate anxiety among customers.
Secondly, the manufacturer may view the software as part of a
hardware system sold by the manufacturer and may resist using any
software license agreement. Thirdly, the manufacturer will wish to
impose minimum restrictions on its customers in order to maximize
the marketability of its hardware and lower its cost of administra-
tion. The end result is often difficult negotiation over terms of the
vendor/manufacturer license agreements that are often ignored in
practice by all but the lawyers. 97
The foregoing example involved only three levels of distribu-
tion: the vendor, the manufacturer and the end-user. Even for
three levels, separate license agreements, including provisions gov-
erning end-user licenses, would have to be negotiated between the
software vendor and each manufacturer of the computer systems
with which it deals. In practice, however, software distribution can
involve four or more levels. For example, an application software
vendor might license its application program to a second software
system vendor that would embed that applications program in an
integrated software system; and the software system supplier might
then license that system to a number of different computer hard-
ware manufacturers, that would in turn license the software system
with their hardware added to integrated systems manufacturers for
distribution through distributors, international marketing compa-
nies and dealers. With so many parties involved, the complexity,
cost and delay involved in negotiating and drafting satisfactory li-
96. See supra pp. 39-40.
97. It is the author's experience that administrative compliance with software licensing
agreements is generally poor for three reasons. First, much software development and licens-
ing occurs in the context of small entrepreneurial businesses that have neither the attitude nor
the resources for careful monitoring of contract compliance. Secondly, most business people,
not surprisingly, do not understand the subtleties and fine distinctions made by the laws
respecting intellectual property in software. Thirdly, (see notes 17 & 18) copying of software
is so easy and inexpensive that without strong internal mechanisms to prevent it, most busi-
nesses are unable to control the temptation of their technical employees to do what comes
naturally in order to solve technical problems. As a result, copyright laws are often observed
in the breach where software is concerned, especially in research and development laborato-
ries where the chance of detection and prosecution is minimal.
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cense agreements at all levels rapidly escalates.98
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. The Problem
The crux of the difficulties with current software licenses is
that the operative areas of copyright and trade secret law were de-
veloped to govern things that have nothing to do with software.
Copyright law was originally developed to protect books99 although
Congress has engrafted a number of provisions on it to deal with
such modern devices as records and television. tI As commentators
have observed', however, copyright law was developed to protect
communication between people, and not instructions intended for
the operation of a machine.
As for trade secret law, it was not developed to protect secrets
disseminated to the public in a form not readily understood by peo-
ple that is intended to be used to operate machines. The result of
this misdirected application is, as one might expect, that neither
copyright law nor trade secret law precisely fits the software indus-
try, and that both impose upon the industry undesirable uncertainty
and administrative and legal expense.
B. Repeal of First-Sale Doctrine for Software
The first step in solving these problems should be a repeal of
the first-sale doctrine of copyright law, 1 2 at least as it may apply to
98. To take one example from the author's experience, a software vendor might license
software to a computer hardware manufacturer that in turn sells hardware to a number of
different computer systems manufacturers for incorporation into their products. To protect
its trade secrets, the software vendor must attempt to control to some degree how the second-
level manufacturers license the software to their end users. Usually, however, the first-level
manufacturer does not know who the second-level manufacturers will be until after the
master license with the software vendor is negotiated. Very often, the first level manufacturer
must renegotiate the license to take account of needs of the second-level manufacturers that
were not considered in negotiating the master license. Moreover, if one second-level manu-
facturer is able to negotiate concessions in the master license relating to the end-user license
terms, other second-level manufacturers may see that second-level manufacturer's end-user
license in the marketplace and may demand similar concessions. The prospects for renegoti-
ation may seem interminable, and the transaction costs high, especially to a small software
vendor dealing with large manufacturing clients.
99. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[D][2] (1984).
100. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § Ill (secondary transmissions by cable systems and others);
§ 114 (phonorecords); § 116 (uke boxes) (1978); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 560, 562
(1973).
101. See, e.g., CONTU Report, supra note 17, at 28-30 (Commissioner Hershey,
dissenting).
102. See supra pp. 39-40.
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computer software. While the doctrine conforms to established cus-
toms and human expectations where books are concerned, it is inap-
propriate for computer softwire for four reasons. First, computer
software is not as portable as books. Each computer program is
designed to operate on a specific computer with a specific operating
system or, less commonly, on a specific range of computers with
specific operating systems. A computer program intended for one
machine may be useless on another or, worse yet, may appear useful
but may produce disastrous latent or unexpected errors when used
on the incorrect machine. The software vendor has a strong and
legitimate interest in ensuring that this does not happen - its desire
to insure continued satisfaction of its customers. Secondly, custom
and the vendee's expectations are different for books than for com-
puter programs. A book buyer views a book as a piece of personal
property like any other chattel. In contrast, a user of computer
software is normally conscious of obtaining an intricate high-tech-
nology article that is to be used only to perform useful work under
specifications and operating instructions provided by the vendor.
Thirdly, and most importantly, even with the advent of inexpensive
photostatic copying machines, the cost of copying a book is roughly
comparable to the cost of purchasing it, so that the temptation for
illicit copying is not too great. 0 3 In contrast, the cost of copying
computer programs is often several hundred to several thousand
times less than the cost of obtaining legitimate licenses from the
vendor,"° so that there is great temptation for borrowers to misuse
the rental right subsumed under the "first-sale" doctrine. Finally,
although some books require periodic supplementation or updating,
the vast majority of books are complete in themselves. Unlike
books, software usually requires periodic maintenance, support,
correction and modification by the vendor to realize the functions
that the customer desires. 105
103. For example, at a typical "consumer" cost of 5 cents per page, it would cost $20 to
copy a 400-page book, roughly the cost of purchasing a book of that length in hardbound
form.
104. The cost of copying consumer software such as VisiCalc or Lotus 1-2-3 is the cost of
a floppy diskette, approximately $2, plus a few minutes of time. The license fee for legitimate
use, however, may range from one to several hundred dollars. The disparity between the cost
of illegitimate copying and licensing large programs for mainframe computers can be much
greater.
105. Software, particularly if it is a new product, is seldom marketed without "bugs."
Users protect themselves by demanding extended warranties if they have sufficient bargaining
power, or by paying for maintenance service by the vendor, which can consist of efforts to fix
"bugs" or the delivery of standard maintenance "updates," consisting of corrections to the
software and perhaps new features.
19851
54 COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGYLA W JOURNAL
For all these reasons, the first-sale doctrine should not apply to
computer software. Indeed, if copyright law is to reflect the norms
of actual use in the industry, it should restrict the end user's rights
to use of the software for the end user's internal purposes on the
computer system for which the software is obtained. This is in fact
what most software vendors expect, and this is what most software
licenses currently provide in one form or another. Of course, the
current statutory provision for making and storing backup and ar-
chival copies of the software' 016 should be retained, but it should be
limited to the purposes for which the user's copy of the software
may be used.
Whether or not this precise formulation is enacted into law, the
first-sale doctrine, as applied to computer software, should be
changed. The proper purpose of any such doctrine should be to
specify the norms governing private relationships in the absence of
explicit agreement. If the doctrine is to have maximum usefulness,
it should specify a legal relationship that is in accordance with pre-
dominant custom and the natural expectations of the parties. In the
realm of software, this custom and expectation is definitely not that
the software user has an unrestricted right to transfer, lease and
lend the software. Producers of video cassette works, for similar
reasons, have achieved some movement in Congress to repeal the
first-sale doctrine as applied to video cassettes; 10 7 perhaps the
software industry can piggyback on their efforts and achieve repeal
of the doctrine for computer software as well.
C. Trade Secret Law
The problem of inappropriateness of trade secret law for com-
puter software is not so easy to resolve for two reasons. First,
although the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has achieved passage in
several states,' 08 trade secret law is generally not a creature of stat-
ute, but of the common law. Secondly, trade secret law is a creature
of the individual states, not the federal government, so uniform en-
actment in all the fifty states would be necessary to achieve appro-
priate change, in the absence of federal legislation.
A solution can be approached, however, by considering the
106. 17 U.S.C. § 117, as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-517 (1980).
107. See 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), 350-351 (Aug. 2, 1984) (HR
5938, a bill to repeal the first-sale doctrine for phonorecords, but not for video cassettes,
passes House). See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, App. B; see generally, Klitzke, "The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act," 80 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 157-171, 201-215 (1982).
108. See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, App. B for a partial listing of adopting states;
see also 14 U.L.A. 537 (1984).
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objectives that a modified form of trade secret protection should
satisfy. First, like existing trade secret law, any new form of
software protection should resolve the uncertainty of copyright law
by providing unambiguous coverage for the ideas, algorithms and
other functional elements of computer software, and not merely
their expression in a particular fashion in computer code. Secondly,
like existing trade secret law, any new form of protection should not
allow anyone to appropriate for himself what everybody knows,
that is, what lies in the public domain. Thirdly, in order not to
hamper the healthy and rapid growth of the software industry, any
new form of protection should not protect against truly independent
creation of the same idea or algorithm by another. Finally, in order
to render the law certain in application, any new form of protection
should not depend upon a lengthy or expensive government applica-
tion process or an ex post facto assessment of the reasonableness of
steps taken to secure practical protection by the software vendor. 0 9
A curious thing about this list of objectives is that, except for
the first, all are satisfied by copyright law as it currently exists in the
United States, but for the principle of Baker v. Selden." 0 In that
case, an author had developed a system of accounting forms now
known as "T-accounts" and had written a book about them, and his
heir sued the author of a similar book for copyright infringement.
Since the other book had not copied the original author's expres-
sion, and the United States Supreme Court held that neither the
idea of a system of T-accounts nor their form were proper subject
matter for copyright. In this decision, the Supreme Court invoked
the fundamental, if somewhat elusive, distinction between expres-
sion and idea as the touchstone of copyright protection, which is
now enshrined in the Copyright Act at Section 102(b).
Were it not for this distinction, copyright law would provide
an ideal sort of protection for computer software. Just as copying
of expression may be proven today by evidence of access and sub-
stantial similarity of result, H so could copying of ideas and algo-
rithms from a computer program be demonstrated or disproved by
focusing on access and substantial similarity of result. Nor would
the law impede healthy and rapid developm, ent of the software in-
dustry, for anyone would have the right to use precisely the same
109. See supra pp. 49-50.
110. 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
111. See Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, 739 F.2d, 1094 (6th Cir. July
12, 1984) (evidence of both access and substantial similarity required to prove copyright
infringement).
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idea or algorithm as another, as long as it had been taken from the
public domain (i.e., general knowledge) or developed truly indepen-
dently of the other's software effort. Thus, appropriate protection
for computer software might be achieved through the simple expe-
dient of repealing the principle of Baker v. Selden as embodied in
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, for computer software only.
If confined to computer software only,1 2 such a step would not
frustrate the policy objectives underlying the Baker principle. One
such policy involves the overarching importance of maintaining the
free flow of ideas in a free society. 3 This flow is so important that
its hindrance cannot be tolerated even if limited to a prohibition on
copying the ideas of others. In this sense, the principle underlying
Baker v. Selden has First Amendment overtones. Computer
software, however, is not intended to communicate with people, but
to control the operation of the machine. Accordingly, restriction on
the copying of functional ideas used in controlling a machine, as
opposed to their independent creation, would appear not to entail
the dangers to free speech involved in a similar restriction on com-
munications between people.
The second policy underlying the Baker decision was a desire
to preserve the conceptual distinction between copyrights and pat-
ents. The Baker court ruled that statutory protection for ideas,
such as the system of T-accounts for bookkeeping at issue there,
should be protected, if at all, only by a patent grant." 4 Since the
Baker decision, however, the "nonobviousness" standard for pat-
entability has developed through case law and revision of the patent
statute1 5 into a formidable barrier to protection. As discussed
above, this barrier is entirely too high to protect from piracy the
many steps toward innovation, individually small but collectively
significant, that generally occur in the course of developing a com-
puter program. 11 6 Moreover, patent protection, which prohibits in-
dependent creation of patented inventions, would dampen
112. The selective "repeal" of the Baker principle would break no rule of intellectual
property legislation. Congress has established precedent for enacting special rules for special
subject matter, particularly high-technology subject matter, in the existing Copyright Act.
See supra pp. 52-53 and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Title 3 of H.R.
6163, to be codified in chapter 9 of Title 17, United States Code.
113. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
114. Id. at 107.
115. The "obviousness" standard had its beginning in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S.
(I1 How.) 248, 267 (1851), and was developed judicially for a hundred years before being
enacted into the patent statute in 1952. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 10-17
(1966).
116. See supra pp. 34-35.
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innovation in the software industry. Thus the underlying concern
of Baker, that utilitarian function should be protected, if at all, by
patents, would appear inappropriate for software.
There appears to be nothing in the Constitution to prohibit the
selective repeal of the Baker principle. Even for patents, the Consti-
tution contains no specific requirement. The concept of "nonobvi-
ousness" is a creature of case law that ultimately became enshrined
in the statute, and the criteria of novelty and usefulness are cre-
ations of the statute.' 1 7
Alternatively, protection could be achieved under the copy-
right branch of the Copyright Clause, for there is nothing in the
Constitution to prohibit applying copyright protection to ideas.
This principle was established only by the Baker decision itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Last year, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry introduced into the Japanese Diet proposed legislation to
provide a new form of protection for computer software.'1 8 One
reason given for proposing this legislation was that copyright law,
designed as it is to protect literary works, was inappropriate for
computer software. In Japan, there is no such thing as common-
law trade secret protection, backed by injunctive relief, although
similar protection may be achieved by contractual provisions.
The major objection to this proposed legislation was that the
proposed term of protection would be too short.' 19 The proposal
was viewed by some as a thinly-veiled attempt to allow the Japanese
to gain the advantage of foreign software technology in a short pe-
riod of time. Nevertheless, the proposal addressed a fundamental
need, particularly in Japan, for legal protection of software more
appropriate to the medium, function and business of the software
industry.
While trade secret protection provides more secure coverage of
software in the United States than in Japan, its genesis in the com-
mon law necessarily results in vagueness and uncertainty. Embodi-
ment of common-law principles in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
will not substantially alleviate the vagueness and uncertainty of the
common law because that statute generally follows the common
117. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
118. See PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 669, at 424-25 (Mar. 1, 1984).
119. See id. The MITI proposal also would have required compulsory licensing in cer-
tain cases.
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law. 2 ' What is needed is a new form of protection appropriate to
the unique features of computer software - an expression of the
mind of man that serves the utilitarian function of controlling a
machine. Perhaps selective repeal of the first-sale doctrine as ap-
plied to software and a reexamination of the longstanding principle
of Baker v. Selden in the context of software only would permit the
law to achieve appropriate protection without impeding develop-
ment in the software industry or requiring expensive, individualized
negotiation over every business transaction involving computer
software.
120. See generally Klitzke, supra note 107.
